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1 Since  the  paper  was written,  the  CFA Franc  was devalued.  This  does not
affect, in any way whatsoever, the methodology and the findings of this  paper.I  Introduction
Changes in commodity export prices have played an important
role in explaining the economic performance of industrial and of
developing  countries.  In the  developing  countries,  commodity
export  prices  are very  important since more  than  70  countries
derive at least 50% of their export earnings from non-fuel primary
commodities.  In 1985, in Sub-Saharan Africa, primary commodities
exports accounted for 94% of total merchandise exports.
For most countries, fluctuations in the international prices
of  the  main  commodity exports  have  important  implications  for
government revenues since the government is likely to either own
the production facilities (e.g,  Nigeria for oil) or to have set up
a  price  stabilization  fund  (e.g,  Cote  d'Ivoire  for  coffee).
Furthermore,  trade taxes are often an important source  of revenues.
Increased export  revenues,  following a  commodity boom,  usually
result  in a  balance-of-payments surplus and an  accumulation of
international reserves.
Typically,  following a commodity boom, primary commodities
exporter LDC's have experienced  a surge in government expenditures
which continued in spite of the subsequent decline in the price of
primary commodities.  A  survey  of  commodity booms  for  severaldeveloping  countries  (Colombia', Cameroon,  Kenya,  Nigeria  and
Jamaica) can be found in Cuddington  (1989) who generalizes from
countries' experience by concluding that
"there has been a  tendency to overspend  during and following
commodity  export  booms,  which  has considerably  reduced  realizable
welfare  galns..  The  ratchet  effect  of  Increased  government  spending
during booms, which proves dlfficult  to redu7e once the booms
subside,  Is common."  (pp.  154-55).
A  similar pattern  exists  for the  Franc  Zone countries  in
Africa.  For example, in 1975-77, Cote d'Ivoire experienced the
coffee/cocoa boom (tripling  of prices in 2 years) during which the
government  started an ambitious public  investment program which
continued  in spite  of the  reversing  trend  in the  coffee/cocoa
prices.  This led to the accumulation of foreign debt (73% of GDP
in 1987 versus 35% of GDP in 1980).  By 198C  the public sector
deficit had reached 12% of  GDP.  In Niger, the government and its
creditors  did not react  to the collapse  of  uraniTim  prices in the
early  1980's  and fiscal  policy  remained  expansionary  until  1?83.
Although Senegal did  not  experience the  same  magnitude of
fluctuations  in its  term  of trade  as the  rest  of the  West  African
Monetary  Union  countries,  it  nevertheless  continued  its
expansionary  policy,  maintaining  private  consumption  and  expanding
public  consumption,  when the  price  of phosphate  fell.
iMore  detailed  work for Colombia  and the coffee  boom is  avaLlable  in
Cuddington  (1986).This brief review of the experience with commodity booms of
some Sub-Saharan African countries suggests that  in many  cases
countries may even find themselves worse off after the boom a,;_
that their responses have not been optimal 2 (in the sense of not
using periodic surge in export  commodity prices  to restore external
balance and promote economic growth).
The  purpose of this paper  is to  analyze fiscal  policy  in
primary  commodities  exporter  developing  countries.  The  paper
characterizes  the environment in  which fiscal  policy decisions are
made  by  introducing  three  effects  (pressure to  spend,  limited
disinvestment  or policy  reversal  ard  limited indebtedness) and
suggests  that  these  three  effects  may  explain  the  lack  of
consumption  smoothing by  the  fiscal  authorities 3. It uses  an
optimizing  model of government spending to look for evidence, using
data for the Frarc Zone countries in Africa, of the existence of
2There are naturally some exceptions to  this.  Botswana  and Cameroon
limited the Increase in government spending during the commodity booms.  The
experience  of  Cameroon (with  a  comparison  with  that  of  Cote d'Ivoire and  Senegal)
in reviewed in Devarajan and De Melo (1987).
3To  test the permanent income hypothesis for government expenditures, one
can  regress  (see, Cuddington  anC Urzaa,  1987 for  a  similar  approach) the
logarithm  of government expenditure (with  separate regressions for consumption
and investment expenditures) on a permanent and a  cyclical component of the
logarithm  of jovernment  revenues (a  decomposition  of the logarithm  of government
revenues Into  a permanent and  a cyclical component  can, for  example, be obtained
bj the Beveridge and Nelson (1981)  method).  However, the decomposltion itself
is meaningless unless a sufficiently large (and,  if possible, not restricted to
years covering a commodity boom and a commodity bust) number of observations is
available.  Furthermore, this testing approach is valid if government revenues
can  be assumed to be exogenous (i.e.,  no tax instrument available).  This may be
a reasonable approximation for lesser developed and highly primary commodities
dependent African economies.  It is also  possible to test for an asymmetric
fiscal  response  to  commodities  booms  and  busts  by  allowing  for  different
coefficiente whether the cyclical component is positive or negative.
4these three effects and uses Euler equations for the unconstrained
and  the  constrained  version  of  the model  to  evaluate  Lagrange
multipliers  for  the  constraint  associated  with  the  limited
indabtedness effect.
2 Limitations to Fiscal  Expenditure  adjustments  and  Government's
Response
A positive (negative) terms of trade shock resulting from an
increase (decrease) in the international  price of a country's main
export commodity or from a resource  discovery (e.g,  exploitation of
new oil reserves for Cameroon) implies an increase (decrease) in
wealth.  Optimally, the government, if it  has rational expectations
and behaves according to the permanent income theory, should use
commodity booms and busts to smooth its consumption expenditures.
In  particular, as argued by Cuddington (1988),  the optimal response
for an  economy would  be  to  estimate  the present value  of  the
windfall  gain  (loss) and  to  limit  the  increase  (decrease) in
consumption  expenditures  to  the  perpetuity  equivalent  of  this
windfall.  However, as illustrated earlier with the experience of
African countries, commodity  booms are in  most cases accompanied  by
excessive increases in consumption expenditures and by ambitious
investment programs 4. This has a tendency to lock countries into
'Investment  in  project. (preferably  with low  disinvestment  costs if  phasing
out become. necessary) with an internal  rate of return (measured  at appropriate
shadow prices) that exceeds the country's opportunity cost of capital could be
welfare enhancing.  In practice, this is very unlikely to be the case (whitu
elephants).  Thus, although  the permanent income  theory  defines optimal  behavior
5levels  of  spending  which,  in  spite  of  their  unsustainability
(because of  the  resulting  high  level  of  foreign  debt),  are
d.'fficult  to reverse.
Rejection of the permanent income  hypothesis can natarally be
explaii,ed  if it can be argued that temporary booms were genuinely
believed to be permanent or that gqvernments operate with  very
short time horizons.  The approach adopted by this  paper is to
characterize the environment in  which a forward-looking infinitely
lived governmezit  makes its fiscal  decision and to look for evidence
of the existence of  operative constraints and/or costs faced by the
government  which  may  prevent  it  from  behaving  in  a  manner
consistent witn the permanent income  t1,eory. The characterization
of  the environment in  which fiscal  policy decisions must be made is
described below.
Pressure to spend effect
If  the  public  and/or  the  private  sector  face  credit
constraints which  are relaxed during  a boom,  it is likely that
there will be a surge in consumption expenditures at the onset of
the boom.  However, even in the absence of credit constraints, the
same effect on spending can be attained if the government finds
itself  unable  to  restrict  expenditures once  it  is known  that
as  consumption  smoothing  (i.e.,  investing  in  projects  is  a form  of savings),  we
ignore  this and  work  with  total  government  expenditures  wlthout  distingulshing
between  consumption  and investment  expenditures.additional government revenues are available 5. In a country where
there  are  a  lot  of  unmet  needs,  special  interest  groups  or
government  agencies  may  pressure  the  government  into  spending
immediately  a  large amount  of the  increase in wealth  if those
groups or agencies feel uncertain whe...ier  they will be able to
benefit from increased government spending if it is postponed.
Thus, the pressure to spend effect can be given a political
economy cost interpretation.  The const  ..  -. ts can exert pressure
on the government (i.e.  threat of political upheavals such as food
riots or electoral defeat following the removal of subsidies orn
staple food or public transit) if it does not follow their desired
fiscal policy.
The pressure to spend effect, expressed as a constraint on the
budget's surplus, can, for example, be written as
YC#,  - Gc*8 : so  (S'20)  1
We now examine a cost interpretation  of the pressure to spend
effect.  There are two alternative views of how the pressure to
spend arising from a commodity boom can manifest  itself into a
political  crisis.  One  can either  consider that  the  resulting
crisis  is an  all  or  nothing event  (with a  fixed  cost  C,, see
SCameroon, which  avoided  spending  immediately  Its  surplus  from  the
coffee/cocoa (75-77) and oil boom, channeled the additional revenues (without
divulging the amount) Into accounts which did not figure in its governrment's
budget.
ZDornbusch,1988)  or  that  there  can  be  different  degrees  (with
increasin;,  costs' in the seriousness of the crisis (e.g.,  a minor
strike,  a  riot,  a  general  strike  or  the  overthrow  of  the
government).
In  the first case, an apprcpriate  formulation  for the expected
cost  is
E,(C,)  M pi (Y,-G,)  C,  (2)
where p,,  the probability'  of a crisis occurring in period t is an
increasing function of the budget'surplus Y 1 - G,  for that period.
We assume that Y,  and Gt  are immediately knowii  to the constituents
(i.e.,  no lag on  acguiring informnation) 6.
In the secsnd case, an expression for the expected cost is,
for example,
EC(Cl)  =  I[yc-ct2ol  C1(YF  - GC)  ,  C/2 o  (2')
This formulation  which we consider intuitively  more appealing
for  the  type  of  political  crisis  that  is  being  discussed  is
6The probability p,  could also be expressed am a  function of Y,.  - Y,  or of
(Y,.,  - YI)/Y,.  However,  the  probabillty  of  the  constituents  acting  on  their
threat  of rioting  should  be related  to  their knowledge  of  the government's action
and thus be a function of G,. The constituents could also act on their threat
with a  lag, giving the government several  periods to adjust its spending.  This
would only complicate the problem by adding lagged terms in the function p,.
Sselected for the empirical application'.
Note that the expected cost E(C,)  associated with the pressure
to spend effect has a functional forr.  which is consistent with the
functional form selected for the corresponding constraint in the
sense that its expected value is  zero whenever the constraint is
assumed to be non  binding (with  S  - 0) and that it is  an increasing
function of the quantity on which the constraint is imposed$. This
suggests that the expected cost E(C,) should be expressed as the
product  of an  indicator  function  (indicating whether or  not  a
crisis occurs) and of a  measure of the seriousness of the crisis,
for example, the square of the difference between the government's
choseni  and the constituents' desired policy.
Limited disinvestment  or  policy  reversal effect
The marked increase in  government expenditures  which typically
follows  a  commodity  boom  can,  for  example,  translate  into
investment spending on projects or into an increase in the size
(and/or the wage) of the public labor force.  Once this spending
pattern  is in place,  it may become difficult  to reverse.  The
government finds itself  trapped  by  recurrent expenditures  whivh are
inflexible or  even  irreversible.  Furthermore,  the  longer the
7It  leads to a more tractable version of the model aLnce the functional
form for the cost (convex)  does not have to be a probability.
$Thus,  C,  Is related to thc strength of the pressure to spend effect and
as bich measures the extent to which the corresponding constraint is binding.
9higher level of government spending has been sustained, the harder
a  prior.i,  it  will  be to reverse.  Thus, the government faces policy
reversal co_-v  (e.g., disinvestment costs for a project already
started,  labor firing costs) which  a  priori  increase with  the level
of total expenditure (investment)  and therefore increase with the
time span of the  commodity boom.  However, this  effect  could
theoretically  become  inuxistent  for  an  economy  in  which  the
commodity boom has 13sted  sufficiently long so that either it is  at
full capacity and firing costs are small  (i.e., overemployment)
and/or the marginal investment  projects have a lower internal rate
of  return  than  the  projects  undertaken  at  the  onset  of  the
commodity  bo'-.  This  is unlikely, excluding  perhaps  some  oil
exporters, to be the case for the  majority of  developing countriea.
The lir.ited  disinvestment  or  policy reversal  effect, expressed
as  a  constraint  on  government  spending,  can,  for  example,  be
written as
Gr+p-Gr+8_1  2 (a  QI)  (3)
which corresponds to a polity reversal interpretation.'  I;
9Equation  (3)  means  that  there  is  pressure  on the  government  whenever  it
decreases  the  level  of real  government  spending  (w - 0).  w >0  can  be justified
If  policy  revsrsal  is  defined  In  terms  of real  government  spending  per  capita.
'OA  limited  disinvestment  interpretatlon  can,  for  example,  be wrltten  as
Gc+, 2 p
wte#-l
which  is  *qualvalent  to imposing a  lower  bound  on investment.To  formulate  the  limited disinvestment or policy  reversal
effect  as  a  cost,  that  of  contracting  fiscal  policy  during  a
commodity bust, we once again assume that the pclitical crisis (a
function of the state of the economy and of the actions of the
government)  is  of  varying  intensity  and  we  ignore  fixed  cost
formulations.
The  nature  of a  crisis  occurring  (its likelihood and  its
magnitude) in period t should be a function of the capital stock
K~.,  (i.e.,  the state of the economy at the beginning of the period)
and of the government expenditures G,  (again  we postulate that the
government's action influences the way the constituents respond).
As has been explained earlier, the likelihood and/or the magnitude
of a crisis occurring at the onset of an adjustment program adopted
by the government should be increasing in  KA (for  example, cutting
teacher's salaries is likely  to be  more disruptive if  the number  of
teachers is  high) and should be decreasing in G,. Assuming away any
lag in  the constituents acquiring information  about the economy and
defining policy reversal by G,  - G 1 < 0,  the expected cost E(C 2) can,
for example, be expressed as
E,(C2)  - C2(G 1,K, 1)  (4)
with
C2 (Gc, Kt-1)  9  a  C2(Gt,Kt  2  0  (5)
aGc  Kt- 1A  simpler  iunctional  form,  adopted  for  the  empirical
application,  which is  consistent  with the constraint formulation of
the limited disinvestment or policy reversal effect (for  X  =  0) is
given by
E,(C2)  - 1(G.-G  ,  O1  C2(G,I  - G,)  ;  C220  (4')
Note  that  a  priori,  considering  changes  in  government
expenditures of equal magnitude, the cost of a political crisis
triggered by a transition from a high level of spending to a low
level  of  spending  (i.e., adjustment)  should  exceed  that  of  a
political crisis triggered by the lack of transition from a  low
level of spending to a high level of spending.  In  the former case,
the  government  requires  its  constituents  to  readjust  their
consumption level to a lower level (to  which they may no longer be
used to if the commodity boom has lasted sufficiently long) while
in the latter  case, it only requires its constituents  not to switch
to  a  higher  consumption  level  (to  which  they  are  not  yet
accustomed).
Limited indebtedness effect
The third and last effect which characterizes the environment
in which the government must set its fiscal policy  is a credit
rationing constraint.
12At the onset of a commodity bust, as long as foreign financing
is available, the country is able to sustain its spending pattern,
thus avoiding the political costs of reversing its fiscal policy.
Naturally,  foreign  reserves  are  depleted  and/or  the  level  of
foreign debt  rises.  Sooner or  later, the country will  face a
borrowing  constraint  on  the  international  capital  market  and
adjustment, often at the request of  the lending  institutions (e.g.,
IMF),  will  have  to  take  place.  Poor  investment  projects,
substantial  government's  budget  deficit  and  large  external
indebtedness will then make adjustment a lot more costly than it
would have been, had the government been able to manage better (in
the  sense of behaving more closely to what  is predicted by the
permanent income theory) its commodity boom.
The limited indebtedness  effect, expressed as a constraint on
wealth, is written as
A+, 2  -A  (6)
3 Fiscal Policy Optimizing Model
The purpose of this section is to formulate a fiscal policy
optimizing model which  incorporates the three effects introduced
above with the pressure to spend and the limited disinvestment or
policy  reversal  effects  expressed  as  costs  and  the  limited
indebtedness effect expressed as a constraint.
13Our model of government's behavior is ar.  expenditure choice
model based on intertemporal optimization in a dynamic stochastic
environment.  The  government's  income Y, is a  function  of  the
international price P, of the main export commodity.  Since P' is
a  general  stochastic  process,  Y, is  also  a  general  stochastic
process.  We assume that the government maximizes a time separable
utility function with  an instantaneous utility function of real
government expenditures G,  for period t and of services received
from the beginning of period t capital stock K,-. Assuming those
services to be proportional to the  capital stock,  we have  the
following maximization problem:
Max  E.  i  (1+e)-'(U(Gt, 81Kc.,)
-t+  0  (7C 1 (Yt.  - Ge.a)  - C2(Gca,1  - G.]
subject to the capital and wealth accumulation equations
Kt.,  a  y Gt.,  +  (1  -8)  Kc.,-, 
AC+ n  (1+r)At+&l  + yt  - Gt.  C)
and to the constraint equation (6)
At.,  2  -A  (6)
where
itE,  is the expectation conditional on information available at
time t;
U  is the  one  period  utility  for consumption  and  services
received from the capital stock;
6 is the constant rate of time preference;
e  is  the  constant  fraction  of  government  expenditures
allocated to investment;
6 is the constant rate of depreciation;
r is the constant real rate of interest;
Y,  is real government revenues; and
A,  is the real end-of-period wealth.
The decision problem is sequential with the following timing.
At the begirning of each period, the government learns Y,.  The
government then reoptimizes by selecting G,  for the period.  This,
in turn, determines A,  and K.  Thus, for this problem, the control
variable is government spending G,  and the state variables are the
capital stock K,  and the wealth  A,.  A, should be thought of as
liquid  wealth.  K,  is not considered to be a part of wealth because
the  capital  is  assumed  to  have  no  resale  value  (once spent,
investment is sunk).
Even  without  constraints,  analytical  solutions  to  the
optimization  problem when income is  stochastic cannot in  general be
derived, except  in some simplifying cases.  (See, for example,
Blanchard and  Fischer, Chapter 6, 1989.)  Nevertheless, we can
write first-order conditions which are necessary for maximization
laof the welfare function.  The first-order conditions are derived
from an application of the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to the Bellman
equation.
The  value  function  W, satisfies  the  following  recursive
equation (Bellman equation)
Wt (At,  K)  =Max  [U(G,,K))+(1+0) 1E  (W  .,(Ael,K,,))
Gt
-C 1 (Yt-Gt)  - C2 (Gt-Gt)  (10)
+**t (At+A')
where \  is the Lagrange multiplier  (known at time t) associated
with the borrowing constraint at time t.  The Lagrange multiplier
at time t is equal to the increase in  the objective function (from
time t  on) if the corresponding (current)  constraint is relaxed by
one unit.  If  the constraint is  binding, \  should  be positive since
overall utility would  increase if the  government  were  able  to
borrow an extra dollar.  It cannot be negative since, given the
absence of  an upper  bound  on wealth,  the  limited  indebtedness
constraint does not prevent the government from saving more.
To  derive  the  Euler  equation,  we  derive  the  first-order
condition associated with the equation above, eliminate the value
function  by using the envelope theorem,  push one period forward and
apply rational expectations.  Assuming, for ease of computation,
that  the  real  :ate  of  interest  is equal  to  the  rate  of time
16preference (r  - 0) ,  that there is no depreciation (6  - 0) and that
all government spending is allocated to some form of capital (  -
1), we  obtain the following equation:
(I  +r)  (UjZ(Gc,  K)  - Ug,.,(Ge-  IKt-1)
+  U(lr(GUKt)  - UGC,K  (Gt,  UKe,K)
+  CI'(Yt-Gt)  - C"(Yt.l  - Gt+,)
+(1+r) (  C1(YCGd)  - C (Yyt-  - G^)  )  :L)
+  (1+Z)  (  -Ca(GC. 2-GC-G)  + C2 (Gt-l-Gt)  )
C'3(G,-Gt,.)  +  C2(G,--G,)
t-  A  - zAt
+ Ut  +  Ut*l
where u.  and u+  are error terms with zero means and respectively
uncorrelated with any information  available at time t-l and at time
t.  All derivations are shown in Appendix 1.
4  Desoription  of  the  Test
Zeldes (1989)  shows that empirical rejections of  the permanent
income  theory  can  be  explained  by  the  presence  of  liquidity
constraints.  He derives the Euler equations for a  consumption
optimizing model with and without borrowing constraints aid tests
17whether borrowing constraints are binding by testing whether the
unconstrained Euler equations are violated.  This approach follows
Hall(1978).  The advantage  of testing Euler equations is  that it is
not necessary to specify the stochastic process for the exogenous
variable  (in our case government  revenues) and  that  it  is not
necessary to obtain a closed form solution for consumption  (i.e
fiscal policy).  (See, for example, Mankiw  (1985).)
A currently binding constraint leads to the violation of the
unconstrained  Euler  equation.  We  do  not  have  a  closed  form
expression for the Lagrange multiplier.  It should be a function of
the state variables at t and of expected values of these variables
from  time  t+1  on".  Therefore,  since  the  Lagrange  multiplier
appears in the error term, estimation of equation (11)  with a data
set that includes constrained  observations (i.e.,  observations for
which  at  least one of the constraint  is binding) will  lead to
inconsistent  parameter estimates.
As a  consequence, it is necessary to  split the  sample  of
observations  into  two  groups:  one  for  which  the  borrowing
constraint is  a  priori  not binding and the other one for which the
U.Since  ^+,  can  be  expresmed  as  a  functlon  of  K,  A,  ,  and Y.,  (K.  *  y
((1+r)A  +  Y+1  - -+)  +  (1-6)K,)
the  Lagrange  multlp  er  are  functions  of  A,  a  and  of future  valuem  of  A and of
Y,.
laconstraint is  a  priori  binding" 2. Estimation of the Euler equation
for the  data  set restricted  to unconstrained observations will
yield consistent parameter estimates.
The test of liquidity constraint is based on an estimator of
the error term of the constrained Euler equation.  This estimator
is obtained by getting a numerical estimate of the residual in
equation  (11) using  the  consistent parameters  obtained  by the
estimation  of  that  same  equation  for  the  unconstrained
observations.
These numerical estimates of the residuals are the sum of the
expression  involving the Lagrange multipliers  in the right hand
side of equation (11),  the true residual and an error term.  If the
sample is large enough, the sample means of the true residual and
of the error  term will  converge to  zero and, by averaging the
numerical estimates of the residuals, we will obtain  an estimate of
the average of the expression involving  the Lagrange  multipliers in
the right hand side of equation (11) for the group of constrained
observations.
Taking the  average over T  observations of the residual of
12Note  that even if unconstrained observations are included in the group
of constrained observations (and  therefore, excluded), the parameter estimates
will still be consistent but that if one or more constrained observations are
included  in  the  group  of  unconstrained  observations,  the  parameter  estimates  will
be Inconsistent.equation (11),  we obtain 13
1 [  -A+1  - r  2  (2
5 Estimation Results
The model is tested for Franc Zone countries in Africa. The
Franc Zone (or  CFA Zone) in  Africa is  the largest  and most enduring
currency  block.  Thirteen countries are engaged in a monetary union
which involves  pooling of foreign  reserves, a common currency whose
convertibility is guaranteed by France, and a fixed exchange rate
with the French Franc.  (For a description of the functioning of
the Franc Zone, see,  for example, Bhathia, 1985 and Guillaumont
and Guillaumont, 1988.)  The rules of the Franc Zone make it an
ideal case  with which to study fiscal  policy in  primary commodities
exporter developing countries.  By abdicating the right to devalue
and by adopting rigid monetary rules, the member countries (which1
can nevertheless borrow abroad) only have one degree of freedom
left, that of setting fiscal policy, in defining their adjustment
and growth strategy.
13Note that there  are  realizations of Y, such  that the model with the three
effects  expressed  as  constraints  does  not  have  a  solution.  (The three
constraints may be simultaneously binding and inconsistent with each  others.)
However, as long as borrowing constraints are absent  (although  borrowing costs
may become very high), it is possible to formulate the model with the pressure
to spend and the limited disinvestment or policy reversal effects  expressed  as
constraints.  In that  case,  it can be  shown that the  Lagrange multipliers
associated with these two  constraints always appear as a  difference  in the
residual (i.e.,  multiplier at time t - multlplier at time  t-l) and therefore,
that it is impossible  to obtain an estimate  of the average of these multipliers.
UGovernment statistics for African countries are very poor and
data on government revenues  and expenditures  are especially scarce.
Relying  on  the  International Financial  Statistics  (IMP),  the
African Economic and Financial Data  (World Bank) and World Bank
country reports,  government  expenditure and  revenue"4  data  were
retrieved for the following countries and for the following years:
Burkina Faso  (1973-87); Cameroon  (1975-87); COte d'Ivoire  (1969-
87)  ; Gabon  (1973-76 and 1979-87)  ; Senegal (1977-1987)  ; ancd,  Togo
(1977-87).  Variables  for which we had several data source were
systematically checked for consistency.  Given  the lags  in the
Euler equation  (t-2,t-1 and t+l),  an observation qualifies  for
inclusion in the data set if data for the preceding two years and
for the following year  is also available.  The  final data  set
available to test the model includes  61 observations.  Finally, the
capital K variable had to be constructed.  Since no data on capital
stocks were available, a time series for K was constructed (using
available  investment  data)  starting  in  196015  using  an  initial
capital output ratio of 5 and a depreciation rate of 5 percent.
Taylor (1979)  suggests as a rule of thumb a depreciation rate of 4%
and  a  capital  output  ratio  of  3.  Since  he  is  referring  to
developing  countries  as  a  whole,  *lightly  higher  figureL  are
14In some  cases,  data  on government  revenue  was unavailable. However,  a
figure  could  be constructeo  using  data  on  government's  expenditures  and  primary
deficit.
1 5K is  built recursively as
K  K  . 1 (1-6) +  I,  with KN *  5 YO.
Although all series,  except C6te  d'lvoire which starts in 1969, start  In 1973  or
after, the capital *erLe .. as inltiallzed in 1960 In  order to reduce sensitivity
to the choice  of the initial capital output ratio.selected for African countries.
The criteria used for splitting  the data is as follows:
i)  the  limited  indebtedness  constraint  is  assumed  to  be
binding whenever real net foreign assets of the monetary sector"
are negative or low' 7.
Real net foreign assets  of the  monetary sector is not what tue
wealth variable A is supposed to measure.  However, it is A priori
the case t  ,-t  the government faces a liquidity constraint whenever
real net foreign assets are low.  In particular, the absence of a
market for government bonds in  the Franc Zone prevents open market
operations.  Therefore, all government borrowing  is essentially
foreign, either directly through the central bank or indirectly
through public enterprises which in turn borrow abroad.  Thus, the
real  net  foreign asset variable  is an  indicator of the  latent
wealth variable A.
Note that when a constraint is binding at time t, more than
one  observation  must be eliminated since the  corresponding Lagrange
16 Avoirs Exterieurs (Net)
1 7The no ion  of "mlow"  is Itself had hoc.  However, for each country, time
series  observations for  the  wealth  variable  were such  that the  difference between
the largest value  for which  the observation was  rejected  (I.e., constraint
assumed to be binding) and the smallest v_.ue for  which the observation was not
rejected was substantial (i.e.,  well in excess of the magnitude of the largest
of  the "low"  values).  Furthermore,  excluding  observationa  with a  negative  wealth
or with  a negative or  "low" wealth did not produce very different results.
Therefore, since  the larger  number  of  observations in  the first  case implies  more
degrees of  freedom, the criteria adopted for splitting the data  is that of
excluding observations with a negative wealth variable.
22multiplier also appears in the error term at time t-1 and at time
t+1.
Using the criteria above, 31  observations  had to be eliminated
on the basis of wealth alone and the unconstrained Euler equation
data  set  which  can  a  priori  be  used  for  estimation  has  31
observations.
The model is specified as follows.
Both utilities are assumed to be quadratic with
U(GCIKc)  = A  - "  (Gt; - 27)2 - (Kt_  - z  (1S)
where G arnd  K are country specific"l.
Alternatively, we could assume the instantaneous  utilities to
be  of the  constant elasticity  of  substitution form.  However,
meaningful convergence results were difficult to obtain wit, this
specification.
The costs are also assumed to be quadratic with
11Note  that G and K require time subscripts if it is deviations from the
respective  permanent  components  which  are  penalized. However,  a  meaningful  value
of G (and of K  constructed, for example, by using a permanent decomposition of
public investment) can only be obtained if we have enough observations.  For
simplicity, we  ignore that differences in the permanent components from one
period to the next appear in the first-order condition.
23C(Yt  - Gt) - 1CY,-at1oI(Yt  Gt))
1 [y.o  -2.  1  if Y-GtO  ;  0  otherwise
C2 (Gt,  Gt-)  [GGo]  t-  C)  (17)
1ls  ol  1  if  Gt-Ge50;  0  otherwise
where the indicator functions  are constructed  as dummies using data
for each country on Y,,  G,.,  and G,.  (An exponential formulation for
the costs  (i.e.  Xexp(Y,  - G,);  Mexp(G,,  - G,),  does not require the
use of indicators (dummies)  and is such that the costs are non zero
for all observations.)
Under  these  assumptions, the  unconstrained  Euler  equation
becomes  (for each country,  K and G cancel  out):
p (2+r)  (K1  - Kt_.)  +4 (Gt  - Gt+)  +ca  (l+r)  (Gt  - G-  )
+A1  t-  r.-Gt.,I  W(Yt+l  GC+I)
-A1Irtao)( 1+1 +r)  ( Y,-G,)
+lla(Ye  a;o  (I+r)  Y---)
C  18)
+11 1tar.1-Occal  (GC-Gt-l)
l  ,so  ( 1 +  1 +Z  )  ( Ge-I-Gt  )
+>lo  s-L  I  S  (1+.r)  (Gt-2-Gt-,)
O~~~~~~2Note that since a utility function is defined up to an
affine  transformation, neither A  (which does not appear  in the
equation) nor a (or  0)  are identified.  Therefore, setting a equial
to 1, there are three parameters to be estimated' 9:
$  a utility parameter;
X a cost parameter for the pressure to spend effect;and
A  a cost parameter for the limited disinvestment effect 20.
The  stochastic  Euler  equation  that  must  be  satisfied  in
equilibrium implies orthogonality conditions that depend in a non
linear  way  on  the  variables  and  on  the  unknown  parameters.
Estimation  of  the  model  is done  by  Non  Linear  Least  Squares.
However, given the presence of u 1 in the error term, consistency of
the  parameter  estimates  require  the  use  of  a  generalized
instrumental variables method. 2 1  The  estimation technique used
19The  estimation  results  are  not  very  sensitive  to  the  choice  of  the
discount  rate.  The  discount  rate  (equal  to the  rate  of time  preference)  selected
is  10  percent.
20Note  that  the  three  parameters  above  are  actually  all  measured  relative
to  a  (i.e.,  p/a,  l/a  and  p/a)  and  are  also  (since  the  first-order  condition  is
hcmomeneous  of  degree  one)  independent  of  the  unit  in  which  all  variables  are
expressed.  The  parameters  can  be  given  the  following  interpretation.  Let  CQ
designate  the  disutility  of  government  spending  deviating  from  G by  an  amount  Q.
Then,  the  disutility  associated  with  the  pressure  to  spend  effect  for  a  surplus
in  the  amount  of  Q  is  ACQ  while  the  dioutility  associated  with  the  limited
disinvestment  or  policy  reversal  effect  for  a  reverBal  of  policy  in  the  amount
of  Q  is  PCQ.  A  more  interesting  quantity  is  the  ratio  j/X  which  measures  the
relative  importance  cf the  costs  and  which  a priori,  as  has  been  argued  earlier,
should  be  greater  than  one.  An  alternative  formulation  is  .o write  all  the
quantities  in  terms  of  percentage  of  GDP.  However,  the  results  obtained  were
not  satisfactory  (insignificant  parameters).  In any  case,  we  are  more  interest3d
in  testing  whether  the  parameters  are  of  the  expected  sign  and  different  from
zero  rather  than  measuring  their  magnitude.
2 1The  Euler  equation  is  of  the  form  E,(f(x,,,))  =  0  where  f(x,+.,P)  is  a
vector  of  residuals.  The  use  of  instrunments  z, means  that  we  are  minimizing  a
quadratic  form  of  residuals  which  have  been  projected  (f(x,,.,P)ez,)  into  the
25follows Hansen  (1982)  ancl  Hansen and Singleton (1982).
As argued in Hansen  (1982),  the method of moments estimator
used  is  consistent  even  when  the  disturbances  are  serially
correlated and the instruments are not exogenous.  However, the
asymptotic covariance matrix of  the estimates depends on the choice
of the symmetric positive definite matrix used to construct the
"distance" which is minimized.  Newey and West ,1987)  show that if
the highest order m of zero non correlation in the error term is
non  zero, the  asymptotic covariance matrix  used  by Hansen  and
Singleton  (1982)  may  be  inadequate.  This  interferes  with
asymptotic confidence interval formation and hypothesis testing'.
As indicated earlier, the parameter estimates are not very
vector  space  generated  by the  instruments  z,.
22Given the way observations  from  different  time  periods  and  from  different
countries  are combined,  the  covariance  structure  is complicated.  Since the model
is  estimated  after  a  set  of  a  prLori  constrained  observations  has  been
selectively  deleted,  the  estimation  data  set  is such  that  for each  country  the
observations  are  not  necessarily  consecutive  observations.  This  makes  it very
difficult  to  assume  a  cornmon correlation  structure  (across  time).  AR(l)
processes  were  fitted  for the  residuals  (by countries)  obtained  for each  model
and did  not  indicate  (except  for  three  observations  for  Cote  d'Ivoire)  strong
first-order  correlations  (p  of  the  magnitude  of  0.3  and  insignificant).
Furthermore,  since  the  countries  of the sample  depend  on different  products  for
their  exports  and  since  the  prices  of  these  commodities  are  not  very  closely
correlated  (see, Honohan,  1990b),  we can assume  the commodities  price  shocks  to
be uncorrelated  across  countries.  Since  the  countries  in the  sample  are all  in
the  Franc  Zone,  their  monetary  shocks  are  correlated  and  they  share  exactly
(assuming  away  differences  in the  pattern  of trade  with  countries  other  than
France)  the  same  exchange  rate  shocks.  However,  the  majority  of  deleted
observations  corresponded  to  time  periods  of  greater  exchange  rate  volatility
(ire  ,  greater  variance)  and  the  estimation  data  set  is  such  that  the  most
important  component  of the  shocks  should  be the  commodities  price  shocks.
Thus, we assume m=0 and the estlmation  procedure  adopted  is the generalized
instrumental  variables  method  of Hansen  of Singleton  (1982) which  is consistent
and  robust  to both  heteroscedasticity  and  serial  correlation.  (For m=O,  Newey
and West'  and  Hansen  and Singleton'  asymptotic  covariance  matrices  coincide.)
26sensitive to the value selected for r (a  grid search  with r varying
in  increment  of  5  percent  from  5  percent  to  35  percent  was
conducted).  Note  that  even  with  r  fixed,  the  Euler  equation
remains non linear since the costs themselves are non linear.  For
example, with G+  as the dependent variable, the coefficient of Gt
is (the indicator functions being constructed as dummies)
(2  +r)  (1  *  l(r.OOJ  Oj+  1L1  EOee-0.,so  4  (Ge',l-Gtsol
- I  l  'A  P[oat-as}o
For  r  =  0.10,  the  parameter  estimates  (t-statistics  in
parentheses)  are  as  follows
a  0.086  (1.68)
A  -0.50  (0.52)
A  1.70  (1.80)
Given the functional form of the cost functions, it is very
difficult to obtain significant estimates for the cost parameters
since a large share of the observations for which the cost dummies
are zeros have a  zero cost".
23Prior  to selectively  deleting a  priori  co,strained  observations,  the cost
Cl  In  non zero for only 20 (out  of 54 and not 61 due to the use of Instruments)
observations (out  of which 11  remain in  the estimation  data met) and the cost C.
is non zero for only 25 observations (out  of which 13 remain in the estimation
data set).  This is the rationale for the exponential functLonal form of the
costs given above.  Unfortunately, convergence was difficult to obtain with the
exponential formulation.
27Since the coefficient for the cost Cl  is a  priori.  expected to
be significant, it  may be that something else other than  the budget
surplus, and in particular a price signal (e.g.,  difference in the
price of the main export commodity from one period to the next),
determines the pressure to spend effect 2 '.  However, assuming that
the cost is exclusively a function of a difference in price is not
satisfactory since presumably the government's fiscal policy does
affect whether or not and to what extent the pressure to spend
effect  manifests itself. This suggests  to keep the same functional
form for the cost Cl  but to express the coefficient X as a function
of the magnitude of the change in the export unit value
?~ 1 aO  Co  - '1  I  (1+11pc  c-  (PC;,0  §  PC*1 
which gives the following results:
0.083  (1.50)
X  0.88  (1.05)
M  1.98  (2.21)
X  is  now  positive  and  (although  still  insignificant)  more
significant than before.
Finally, since the estimation results seem to indicate that
the cost Cl  associated with the pressure to spend effect may not
play a very significant role, the model  is reestimated assuming
that the parameter X  is zero which gives the following results:
'4Note  that  since  we  are  worklng  with  Euler  equations,  we  cannot  test  for
the  presence  of  a  cost  Cl  which  is  exclusively  a function  of  exogenous varlable2.
ii.10  (2.48)
1.28  (2.75)
The parameter estimates above are of  the expected sign and are
significant.  Given  the  nature  of the  data  (poor quality  and
scarcity of observations) and the econometric techniques involved
in estimating  the  model,  the  results above  are reasonable  and
consistent with the predictions of the model.  In particular, the
results support the hypothesis of a limited disinvestment effect
since the estimated Euler equation is consistent with that of the
optimizing  model  presented  in the  paper  for which  the  limited
disinvestment effect is expressed as a cost of policy reversal.
The same model  estimated on the entire set of observations
yields the following parameter estimates:
m  0.023  (0.74)
A  0.46  (1.12)
The  poor  significance level  and the substantial  changes in  the
magnitude  of  the  coefficients  suggest  the  parameters  are
inconsistent due  to  misspecification23  (i.e., the  unconstrained
Euler equation  is not valid  for the entire data  set since the
Lagrange  multipliers  for  the  constrained  observations  are  non
25Thia is an informal  specification  test.  The hypothesis  Hg  that our model
is well  specified  for the  restricted data set cannot be tested  by  Itself.
However, assuming Hi  to be true, we can reject the hypotheais H,  that the same
model specification is  valid for  the entire data set.  The results above clearly
indicate that Hz  should be rejected.
2d1zero)  . We now turn to computing an estimate of the average of the
Lagrange  multipliers  associated  with  the  limited  indebtedness
constraint.
For Cfte d'Ivoire, observations up to 1975 have a positive
wealth variable and are included in the data set.  From 1976 until
1986 (except  for 1978),  the  wealth variable is negative.  Averaging
the residuals from 1975 (Xi  =  0) to 1985 (X916  =  X1 2 ￿  0)  ,  we obtain




Therefore,  solving the equation above,  we  obtain the  following
positive (a  priori  X2  is  positive) estimate of the average of the
Lagrange multipliers from 1976 to 1985
sall
2  A5=  10X12  +  2.99
8-2
The above results naturally need to be interpreted  cautiously
since we are far from dealing with a large sample.  However, the
expected  positive  value  of  the  average  of  the  indebtedness
constraint Lagrange  multipliers for  observations  which are believed
to be a  priori  constrained  and the fact that estimation of the same
model  on  the  full  data  set  leads to  very  different  parameter
estimates are evidence that the unconstrained Euler equation is
30misspecified for the  observations  which were selectively  deleted on
the  basis  of  the  wealth  variable  and  that  the  source  of  the
misspecification is the presence of liquidity constraints 26.
6  Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is  to analyze fiscal  policy behavior
in primary  commodities exporters.  The paper  suggests that the
typical surge in fiscal  expenditures which accompanies a commodity
boom and the tendency to maintain that level of expenditures in
spite of a subsequent decline in export commodity prices may be
explained  by  the  existence  of  a  pressure  to  spend,  a  limited
disinvestment  and a  limited indebtedness effects.  These  three
effects characterize the environment in  which fiscal  policy  must be
set.
The  empirical work  is done  with  data  from the  Franc  Zone
countries in Africa.  The paper uses a fiscal policy optimizing
26A  similar  computation for Senegal, for which all the observations are
a priori  constrained, given for  the years 1980  to 1985  (with  1.  a  A0  and 1,
* A  0)
5-6
£  lo=  10(A.-X1)  - 1.25
J-1
which  Is inconclusive.  For  Burkina Faso, for which the  1977 and the  1984
observations are a priori unconstrained and all the observations in between a
priori  constrained, we obtain (with X,r,  - u1  - 0 and XA  - Is  - 0)
,1-
2  A, a0.299
8-2
which is  again consistent with the existence of liquidlty constralnts slnce the
estLmate of the average of the Lagrange multipliers over the 7 years period is
unambiguously positive.
3.model to look for evidence of the existence of the three effects
above and uses the unconstrained and constrained  Euler equations of
the model to estimate the Lagrange multipliers asscoaited with the
limited indebtedness constraint.
The  estimation results suggest that the  pressure to  spend
effect may not play an important role but that policy  reversal
costs  and  liquidity constraints  are  likely  to  play  a  role  in
explaining  the  behavior  of  fiscal  policy  in  the  Franc  Zone
countries in Africa.
Additional work applying the same techniques on a  richer data
set for the Franc  Zone countries or  on data  for other  primary
commodities exporter countries is suggested.
Additional research along the lines of the political economy
models explaining timing  of stabilization (see,  for  example, Drazen
and Helpman 1988, Alesina ar,d  Drazen 1989, Drazen  1990) is also
suggested to understand why these effects exist and what are the
forces behind them.
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34Appendix  I
Derivation  of the Pirst-order Condition
The model is repeated here for convenience.
Max  E.  i  (i+e)-'[U(G,,,,  K.,,)
.-o
Gt;*&  -CI  (Yt.,  - Ge.,)  - C2 (Gc.,  I  - Gt.,)
subject to
Kt,.  - yGt.,  +  (I-&)  Kt#-
Ac#s  - (1+r)A,,,-,  +  Ye*& - Gt*
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The  value  function  Wt satisfies  the  following  recursive
equation (Bellman  equation)
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The first-order condition is
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To eliminate the  value function  from the first-order  condition
above, we use the envelope theorem from which we obtain
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Assuming that r is equal to 9,  that 6  is equal to zero  and
that y is equal to 1, we can rewrite the first-order condition as
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The first-order condition at t-l is
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We now impose rational expectations and we have:
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where e, and C2Z  are error terms with zero mea.is  and uncorrelated
with any information available at time t-1.
Taking the difference between the first-order condition at t
and  the  first  order  condition at t-1 and  using  the assumption
above, we obtain:
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This gives:
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This  enables  us  to  obtain  an  expression  for  the  partial
derivative of the value function with respect to wealth
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Using the envelope theorem, we finally derive the first-order
co,-dition  as:
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